Full text available in Adobe Acrobat format:http://www.ebr.edu.pl/volume18/issue4/2018_4_3.pdf
Volume 4 (18) Number 4 pp. 3-29
Richard Sweeney
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, U.S.A., Claremont Institute for
Economic Policy Studies, Claremont Graduate University, U.S.A. and University West, Sweden
Constitutional conflicts in the European Union: court packing in Poland vs. the United States
Abstract:
Court packing greatly threatens democracy. This paper examines, compares
and draws conclusions from two attempts: The PiS government is near to packing
Polish courts; President Roosevelt tried but failed to pack the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1937. In most democracies a head of government with a legislative majority and
strong party control can pack courts, giving complete control. The United States escaped;
Roosevelt lacked complete party control. Poland is unlucky; PiS is strongly
controlled. Peaceful domestic protest is necessary, but Poland’s hope is from EU-level
institutional pressure, supported by major democracies, to reverse packing and prevent
further seizure of power.
Keywords: Poland, constitutional law, constitutional court, constitutional rights, Supreme Court Compliance, judiciary, court packing, European Union, United States
DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2018.4.1
For citation:
| MLA | Sweeney, Richard. "Constitutional conflicts in the European Union: court packing in Poland vs. the United States." Economics and Business Review EBR 18.4 (2018): 3-29. DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2018.4.1 |
| APA | Sweeney, R. (2018). Constitutional conflicts in the European Union: court packing in Poland vs. the United States. Economics and Business Review EBR 18(4), 3-29 DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2018.4.1 |
| ISO 690 | SWEENEY, Richard. Constitutional conflicts in the European Union: court packing in Poland vs. the United States. Economics and Business Review EBR, 2018, 18.4: 3-29. DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2018.4.1 |