
http://www.ebr.edu.pl/volume17/issue4/2017_4_66.pdf
The aim of the paper is to examine how the introduction of state regulation and self-regulation impacts on the disclosure of director and executive remuneration in Australia. In doing so, we step beyond the simple state-market dichotomy in the extant literature, and proposes a symbiotic association between both regulatory modes for remuneration governance. The study reveals that remuneration disclosure levels are significantly higher after the advent of both self-regulatory and state regulatory reforms rather than state regulation alone. Furthermore, foreign-MNCs which
experience increased agency problems due to spatial complexities and increased liabilities of foreignness do not have a superior disclosure level of director and executive remuneration: findings with important messages for policy makers and for regulators.
MLA | Riaz, Zahid, and James Kirkbride. "Governance of director and executive remuneration in leading firms of Australia." Economics and Business Review EBR 17.4 (2017): 66-86. DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2017.4.5 |
APA | Riaz, Z., & Kirkbride, J. (2017). Governance of director and executive remuneration in leading firms of Australia. Economics and Business Review EBR 17(4), 66-86 DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2017.4.5 |
ISO 690 | RIAZ, Zahid, KIRKBRIDE, James. Governance of director and executive remuneration in leading firms of Australia. Economics and Business Review EBR, 2017, 17.4: 66-86. DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2017.4.5 |