Economics and Business Review

ISSN 2392-1641
e-ISSN 2450-0097

Poznań University of Economics - Poland

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Volume 7 Number 2 pp. 41-58

S&#322,awomir Kalinowski

Pozna&#
3

2

4
; University of Economics, Poland

Alternative bargaining solutions in asymmetric tariff rates negotiations

Abstract: The article was dedicated to the application of cooperative games tools to the particular bargaining problem. The bargaining is about tariffrates between two countries. Analysis was performed on the framework of simple market model with perfect competition within countries and bilateral monopoly relation between them. There were two bargaining schemes applied in order to calculate cooperative solutions. First was Nash bargaining solution, the second was Kalai and Smorodinsky proposition. Both methods successfully indicated cooperative solutions. Application of chosen bargaining schemes brought the conclusion that outcome of the indications of cooperative solutions strongly depends on the nature of explored economic model. The examination of influence parameters' changes proved that worsening the situation of the subject led to the decrease of its benefit in every case. In one case it also caused the decrease of benefit of the other party. (original abstract)
pub/2007_2_41.pdf Full text available in in Adobe Acrobat format:
http://www.ebr.edu.pl/volume7/issue2/2007_2_41.pdf
Keywords: Cooperative game, Market structure, Negotiations, Gry kooperacyjne, Struktura rynku, Negocjacje

For citation:

MLA Kalinowski, S&#awomir. "Alternative bargaining solutions in asymmetric tariff rates negotiations." Economics and Business Review EBR 7.2 (): 41-58.
APA , (). Alternative bargaining solutions in asymmetric tariff rates negotiations. Economics and Business Review EBR 7(2), 41-58
ISO 690 KALINOWSKI, S&#awomir. Alternative bargaining solutions in asymmetric tariff rates negotiations. Economics and Business Review EBR, , 7.2: 41-58.